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Abstract 
Recent political transformation in South Africa has laid the basis for significant socioeconomic 
change. One area in which the greatest socioeconomic disparities are discernable is the agricultural 
sector and rural development in general. Through the medium of a case study of the Eastern Cape 
province, the obstacles and opportunities facing the two predominant farming groups—emerging black 
small-scale farmers and white commercial farmers—are examined. The paper concludes with an 
examination of the economic potential of the former ‘white' areas to sustain the resettlement of people 
previously excluded from that land market on racial grounds.  
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1. Introduction 
South Africa's political rebirth in the early 1990s has laid the basis for significant changes in the 
nation's society and economy. The new government has pledged itself to improving the living 
conditions of the black majority of the population which, for generations, was denied access to 
adequate services and opportunities (ANC, 1994). Since 1994, significant gains have been made in 
infrastructural provision: for example, over 6 million people have been linked to significantly 
improved water supply systems (Sunday Times, 27 April 1997). Despite impressive gains, key 
obstacles remain and one important area in which action is required is that of rural development. As 
discussed below, enormous challenges of poverty and unemployment prevail in rural areas. The 
government's goal, as expressed by President Mandela, is clear in this regard:  
The Government of National Unity is committed to an integrated rural development strategy which 
aims to eliminate poverty and create full employment by the year 2020. Rural people must be at the 
heart of this strategy. (Republic of South Africa, 1995, p. 5). 
Within the context of rural development, the role of agriculture is clearly pivotal. As this paper 
illustrates, considerable problems confront the agricultural sector. It requires measures to enhance the 
existing base and, more importantly, to encourage the participation of those long denied access to the 
primary means of production. Clearly a “vibrant and expanded agricultural sector is a critical 
component of a rural development and land reform programme” (ANC, 1994, p. 102). Such a policy 
position calls for concerted action to address problems of access to land, extension support and 
training for people traditionally denied land.  
This paper is based on a study of conditions in one of the country's largest provinces, the Eastern Cape 
(Fig. 1). Although conditions here are not identical to those in the other eight provinces, the broad 
processes identified by this study provide insight into the current rural development challenges in 
South Africa. This is one of the few provinces where the rural population exceeds the urban and it is 
also one of the poorest. Figures from the Rural Development Strategy (Republic of South Africa, 
1995) confirm this, with 73.8% of the Eastern Cape population being classified as ‘poor' compared to 
an average of 40% for the country as a whole. It is also characterized by deep contrasts between its 
two former black African Homelands (Ciskei and Transkei) and the extensive, predominantly white-
owned, commercial farming districts in the rest of the province. This study focuses on the central parts 
of the province, a zone where black and white interdigitate. The deep contrasts between the two areas, 
and the reality that the white areas neighbouring the Homelands might well be the most logical targets 
for resettlement, justify a study of the current status of agriculture in the two areas and the potential of 
the white areas to absorb new, aspirant farmers. The harsh economic and political consequences of 
poorly applied racially based land resettlement are vividly illustrated by recent events in Zimbabwe, 
where the process seems to be threatening one of the key foundations of its economy and its general 
good standing in the eyes of the international donor community. This serves as a warning to South 
Africa not to set unrealistic aspirations in its own strategies (Financial Times, 1997).  
 
 
Fig. 1. The study area in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. 
 
After briefly outlining the status of agriculture and current rural development thinking (in Africa in 
general and South Africa in particular), attention shifts to an examination of two key issues. First, we 
examine the deep contrasts between the two primary areas and the types of farming in the study area. 
This is based upon a series of detailed interviews undertaken with a range of black and white farmers 
in the central parts of the province. Whereas almost all the black farmers are in the former Homelands 
(Fig. 1), the white farmers interviewed were in likely areas of potential resettlement; namely, those 
districts bordering the former Ciskei Homeland. The second aim is to examine the potential for the 
subdivision of current extensive white farming areas bordering the Homelands into smaller units for 
the resettlement of black farmers. The research results are derived from a series of semi-structured 
interviews undertaken with both black and white farmers, on an individual basis, in the various areas 
examined (see ). In certain cases, such as Ncera and Wartburg, information was also derived from 
posing similar questions in group meetings.  
2. Farming challenges in Africa 
If South Africa is to succeed in developing a successful rural development strategy, there is some 
merit in examining what has been happening elsewhere in the continent. Unfortunately much is 
negative. Between 1970 and 1990 the world food per capita index rose from 100 to 112, whereas in 
Africa it fell from 100 to 84 (in Asia it increased to almost 120). The Food and Agricultural 
Organization has forecast that by 2000 Africa south of the Sahara will be producing only 83% of its 
food requirements whilst in East and North Africa the figure falls to 61%. This is despite the fact that 
for most African countries more than 30% of GDP comes from agriculture and more than 60% of the 
population depend upon agriculture for their livelihood (World Bank, 1997). Less than half of Africa's 
population has access to clean water and in five countries the figure is below 25%. The incidence of 
underweight children has hardly changed in sub-Saharan Africa since 1970, whereas there has been a 
considerable improvement elsewhere. By 2000, about half of the population of sub-Saharan Africa 
will be living below the poverty line, with both numbers and percentages on the increase. In summary, 
between 1970 and 1990 the population doubled, whereas food production increased by only 50%, and 
the gap continues to widen (World Development Report, various years; Thomas, 1994).  
The reasons for this situation are complex. Climatic variability has been cited. The Sahel countries 
have experienced three major drought periods during the 20th century. Many agricultural development 
projects here were developed during the unusually good rainfall years of the 1950s and 1960s, leading 
to a desertward expansion of population. Elsewhere, in Zimbabwe, it has been estimated that, without 
external food aid, two-thirds of the population would have died during the 1992 drought (statement by 
the Zimbabwe Minister for Higher Education, 1994). By contrast, the 1998 floods in East Africa have 
also had a severe impact upon food production.  
Such climatic vagaries have always been present but have been made more apparent by population 
growth. However, much of Africa is not overpopulated and the Club du Sahel argue that in West 
Africa food production will only increase once a denser population supports a better road network and 
farmers have better access to urban markets. Club du Sahel (1995) argues that Africa's food shortage 
stems from a lack of incentives for subsistence farmers to produce a surplus because markets for 
domestic food crops are inaccessible. Seavoy (1989) has expressed a similar view regarding East 
Africa, arguing that cash incentives and technical inputs by themselves are counter-productive.  
Besides long-running civil wars, of which those in Sudan, Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda are the 
worst examples, other important political factors operate. The ruling elites are urban based and often 
externally educated. As a result, rural policies are often out of touch and out of sympathy with the 
rural masses, resulting in top-down policies ill-suited to the needs and aspirations of the African 
peasant. Considerable resources have been directed into large-scale ‘revolutionary' rural development 
projects, usually with poor results. In his plea for a more ‘human'-based scale of development, Carr 
(1977, p. 6) wrote of large projects: “The more you spend on them the less likely they are to succeed”. 
Tanzania's Ujaama village programme, the Algerian 1000-village programme, Sudan's enormous 
expansion of irrigation over the past 40 years and its ecologically unfriendly mechanized agricultural 
programme are cases in point. The difficulties experienced by all these development programmes can 
be explained in part by misconceptions as to peasant priorities. Frequently a secure food and feed 
supply are top priority, cash income coming some way down the list. Peasants are, for a variety of 
reasons, geared to a ‘minimization of input' rather than a ‘maximization of output', running counter to 
many conventional views of development. Unless peasant farmers can identify with the aims of an 
agricultural development programme, it is unlikely to succeed. Rural development projects need to be 
not only environmentally and economically sound, but must also be socially acceptable to those people 
‘planned' to take part.  
Further, export crops help to support government revenue and bring in foreign currency, and so 
research investment has been lacking for food crop production and traditional peasant agriculture. 
Food shortages have been exacerbated by the migration of the able-bodied to the cities, leaving 
agriculture to the elderly and the very young. In some parts of the plains west of the White Nile in the 
Sudan, less than 15% of farmers are aged less than 35 (Davies & Alredaisy, 1995).  
Urban populations in Africa since the 1960s have often been growing at the rate of 5–7% per annum. 
Lagos in the 1960s reached 13% and Khartoum in the 1980s exceeded 10% (Davies, 1991). Among 
many reasons for urban growth has been the low status of agriculture and lack of rural facilities, 
resulting from government bias in favour of city investment associated with the need to keep the urban 
masses at least quiet, even if not happy. As Marshall (1994, p. 294) summarizes: ‘The new elites have 
given priority to the cites where they live extracting the maximum surplus from the impoverished 
countryside'. Governments have often been more concerned with industrialization and mining 
developments, sometimes with catastrophic results. Sierra Leone in the 1960s and 1970s described 
itself as ‘the Land of Iron and Diamonds'. No iron ore is now produced and most of the good diamond 
deposits have been worked out. One result of all this is the low esteem with which farming and rural 
life are held in many parts of the continent. In Uganda in the 1960s, UNESCO learnt that many rural 
parents were paying school fees so that their children could avoid farming; only 13% of rural children 
claimed to want to farm (Davies, 1968). The 1990s situation in much of Africa has changed little:  
The rural exodus is a great problem throughout Africa. The young think that they will be happier in 
town with electricity, running water and bright lights, but when they get there they cannot find work. 
Then they get very frustrated and turn to banditry, theft, delinquency. The answer is not to stop 
education, but to educate people to realise the value of village life and to make living in the country 
more attractive. (Gabon Government official quoted by Marshall, 1994, p. 147). 
Despite the terrible legacy of apartheid, South Africa does not suffer from many of the ills of the rest 
of the continent, and according to virtually every statistic it is better placed. Nevertheless, there are 
certain lessons to be learnt. Any future policy must take into consideration a number of factors:  
• the vagaries of climate; 
• the need to develop an adequate road network and marketing system to give the farmer a reasonable 
return for labour without recourse to overstocking and over-cultivation; 
• the social needs and aspirations of people with different cultural backgrounds; and 
• that large, grandiose schemes require a great deal of careful consideration. 
So often, in such cases, the effect on those ‘suffering' the development is forgotten. All schemes need 
to be not only environmentally and economically sound, but also manageable and socially acceptable. 
All this will count for little unless there is political stability and trust between government and people. 
The political situation has been compounded in South Africa by the country's history of racial 
discrimination and prejudice formerly enforced by a racist government.  
3. The current status of agriculture and rural development in 
South Africa 
Agricultural production in South Africa constitutes just over 5% of the country's GDP, down from the 
20% it enjoyed in the 1930s. Key activities undertaken are maize farming, wheat, deciduous and 
subtropical fruit, sugar cane, vegetables, poultry, sheep and goats (for wool and meat) and the rearing 
of cattle. Environmental constraints are a serious obstacle; “farming conditions are not ideal. Rainfall 
is unreliable and drought a recurring problem” (Editors Inc., 1997, p. 78). As a result, although 80% of 
the country's surface area is used for agriculture, only about 15% is arable. This naturally poses serious 
challenges to plans for land resettlement for previously disadvantaged black rural communities on 
small units.  
In order to boost agricultural activity, particularly amongst the black rural population, issues of access 
to land and the provision of adequate infrastructure and extension support will first need to be 
addressed. The apartheid-induced development backlog is such that in many, predominantly black, 
rural areas less than 1% of residents can be classified as full-time commercial farmers (Bembridge, 
1987). Sub-subsistence activities and urban dependence characterize the majority of rural families 
(Fox & Nel, 1997). The need for land reform legislation and rural development strategies, given such a 
reality, is an undisputed necessity. The passage of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts witnessed the 
extensive dispossession of black rural communities and their confinement to the racial reserves (the 
Homelands) which constituted only 13% of the area of the country (Pickles, 1991). The fact that the 
carrying capacity of the land had already been exceeded in 1918 in the case of the Ciskei Reserve is 
indicative of the severity of the problems that prevail. The near collapse of African commercial 
farming by the 1980s (Bembridge, 1987) in these areas is a deep cause for concern and a natural 
argument for intervention. The new government has clearly been active in trying to address past 
injustices: by November 1996, almost 2 million ha of land had been redistributed, partially through 
land claims resulting from earlier dispossession (Editors Inc., 1997). In parallel, the rights of farm 
workers on white farms to remain on the land have been given proper legal status through the 1997 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act. Concerted programmes designed to promote broad-based 
development in the rural areas, and to obtain additional land through market mechanisms, for aspirant 
small-scale black farmers, have made much slower progress.  
In parallel with the rectification of past injustice through ‘land restitution', the government is also 
committed to a policy of ‘land redistribution' through the use of land already on sale, land acquired 
unfairly and the redistribution of state land. The goal is that the “programme must be demand-driven 
and must aim to supply residential and productive land to the poorest section of the rural population 
and aspirant farmers” (ANC, 1994, p. 2). Although progress has been limited in this regard, the 
redistribution of land is clearly a key government objective.  
A broadly based rural development strategy which can improve socioeconomic conditions in rural 
areas, catalyse economic growth and lay a basis for more productive agricultural activity is clearly an 
urgent priority. To achieve this, the following salient points are identified in the Rural Development 
Framework (draft) (Republic of South Africa, 1997), ‘A 2020 Vision':  
• agricultural diversification; 
• an ‘economy of participation' for local residents; 
• periodic markets; 
• commercial and service diversification; 
• government support and infrastructural provision; 
• water provision; 
• local government support; 
• access to employment, housing and land; 
• improved conditions for children; 
• a productive environment; and 
• the reduction of poverty. 
The justification and need for such interventions are undisputed. This paper does not examine all these 
issues, but rather focuses on agriculture, with its contrasting black and white sectors.  
4. Rural realities in the Eastern Cape 
From a physical viewpoint a key controlling influence is exercised by the Eastern Cape's soils and 
climate. Broadly speaking, west of Port Elizabeth the rainfall has a winter maximum, whereas the 
areas northeast of East London experience a summer rainfall maximum. Thus, in the intermediate zone 
rainfall can be highly variable from year to year. Mean annual rainfall totals in the coastal and eastern 
part of the province exceed 400 mm, tailing off rapidly away from the coast. Temperatures are rarely a 
problem for agriculture, though frosts occur inland. In summary, the climate can be considered as 
semi-arid, being dry and warm throughout most of the year. To compound these difficulties, extensive 
areas are characterized by poor, shallow soils which are not conducive to intensive, arable farming 
(Swart, personal communication, 1994). The dominant vegetation communities are subtropical thicket, 
a little afro-montane forest, and grasslands. The subtropical thicket is expanding in many areas, 
replacing the grasslands and forests as a consequence of heavy grazing pressure (Tinley, 1977; 
Acocks, 1988).  
Culturally, since the 18th century the Eastern Cape has been a zone of racial mixing and conflict. The 
area was occupied by southward-moving black tribes and eastward-moving white settlers leading, in 
the 19th century, to a zone of conflict and tension (Davenport, 1991). Emerging patterns of difference 
and separation were later enshrined in laws enforcing white dominance and access to the most 
extensive land and the key means of production. The formation of the two racial reserves of Ciskei and 
Transkei and the resettlement of thousands of people to them compounded differences, particularly in 
terms of the small size of landholdings allocated, increased rural densities and limited access to state 
support and infrastructure. The net result was the effective collapse of what had become a vibrant 
black commercial farming sector by the beginning of the 20th century (Bundy, 1979). This has led to 
the entrenchment of a dual rural reality. The former Homelands are characterized by extreme 
overcrowding and frequent environmental collapse. The white areas, on the whole, have been 
characterized by low population densities and reasonably high levels of productivity. The drier, more 
marginal areas, however, have suffered from erosion and diminishing stock numbers. These two 
distinct, contrasting areas are now examined separately. The severity of the problems facing the 
former Homelands justifies the significantly greater attention which they receive.  
4.1. Rural realities in the former Homelands of the Eastern Cape 
The Eastern Cape's economy in general is characterized by a series of impediments. There is 
effectively no mining base, manufacturing levels are below the national average and industrial firms 
are concentrated in the primary urban centres. Unemployment levels are extremely high, ranging from 
16 to 85% in the various rural districts (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1991 and 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1994). Many inhabitants rely on gifts, state pensions and 
migrant labour remittances for household survival. Agriculturally derived income in Ciskei does not 
exceed 10% of the average black rural dweller's income (de Wet, 1993) and less than 1% of black rural 
dwellers can be regarded as full-time commercial farmers (Bembridge, 1987). The average male 
absenteeism rate is 31.3% (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1994) and many people are forced 
to rely on the informal sector, including the hawking of foods and mechanical repairs, for their 
economic livelihood. As a result it is no exaggeration to assert that farming is not the chief occupation 
of black rural dwellers in the former Homelands. Rural women are particularly hard hit by prevailing 
poverty and unemployment levels and are in the most urgent need of support and assistance. The 
seriousness of rural poverty, low employment and high dependence levels requires that urgent 
attention be given to the question of employment generation.  
By 1918, land in the Ciskei could no longer provide for the subsistence needs of the population 
(Switzer, 1993). Further overpopulation and overstocking of the land induced serious erosion and 
enhanced the deteriorating conditions. By 1925 household cash income from production was about 
22% of what it had been in 1875 and cash expenditure was less than half (Switzer, 1993). In 1948, 
only 20% of the Ciskei was deemed suitable for arable cultivation. Economic conditions in the area 
worsened, destitution and dependence increasing in parallel. In certain districts up to 75% of the able-
bodied men have become migrants working outside the district on a semi-permanent basis. Decades of 
government discrimination and manipulation clearly succeeded in forcing the black African populace 
into a position of dependence upon European capitalism, entrenching their position as a servile 
proletariat. The adoption of apartheid as a state policy after 1948 exacerbated conditions. The 
government perpetuated the view that the Homelands were labour reservoirs, but simultaneously 
overlaid this notion with its separate development ideology (Davenport, 1991; Pickles & Wood, 1992). 
Large numbers of people were forcibly removed and resettled in what were already seriously 
overcrowded rural areas.  
Details of the current position in Ciskei have been provided through the detailed research of de Wet 
(1993) and Sperber (1993) in the Keiskammahoek District. Here, in rural villages, the formal sector 
employs only 13–32% of potentially economically active people. Unemployment varies from 23 to 
42% in the same areas. Research also established that, at most, 31% of earnings are earned locally or 
through agricultural sales, the balance coming from pensions (up to one-third of income) and 
remittances. Education, health and social service facilities do not meet the existing demands, 
particularly in the more isolated rural communities. The rural areas in Ciskei have reached the position 
of generating minimal output and any development initiative would have to begin with concerted 
programmes to revive the environmental and economic base. Given such harsh conditions, it is small 
wonder that land restitution and resettlement are key issues in the rural development strategies of the 
new South African government.  
5. Interviews with small-scale black farmers in the Eastern Cape 
To assess in more detail the difficulties currently faced by small-scale black farmers, interviews were 
undertaken with representatives of this category at six different locations (see Fig. 1), four in the 
former Homelands (three in Ciskei, one in Transkei) and three in the Border zone between. 
Commercial farming in the former Homelands is effectively non-existent, though many households 
keep occasional animals and cultivate kitchen gardens. Seldom are these undertaken as a major form 
of activity. In the former Homelands where there are some small plots available (often of about 1 ha), 
the recent suspension of state ploughing services, the small-scale nature of production and the isolation 
of such small producers from the market, which is geared to the bulk produce of the large commercial 
farmers, are serious issues of concern (Meyer, personal communication, 1996; Nkayae, personal 
communication, 1996; Nkosinkulu, personal communication, 1997). Emerging black farmers do not 
have access to the levels of state assistance and market share which the government previously 
guaranteed to white farmers. Under these conditions, trying to penetrate established markets is 
extremely difficult. This situation will require national-level support and intervention if new farmers 
are to stand a realistic chance of success. It is important to reiterate the limited nature of small-scale 
black commercial farming. The people interviewed are representative of a tiny rural minority in the 
former Homelands who still have some attachment to commercial farming.  
The difficulties facing any governmental intervention to assist in the emergence of a class of 
successful commercial small-scale black farmers are starkly illustrated in the following analysis.  
5.1. Ciskei 
5.1.1. Hertzog 
Here a black community has successfully established a cooperative which is engaged in intensive 
market gardening under irrigation. This is despite a legacy of being denied access to the land, until 
recently, and the absence of external support (Nel, Binns & Hill, 1997). Despite the impressive results 
achieved by these farmers, their biggest obstacle to further success is their inability to compete 
effectively on the open market. They have no truck to take their produce to market and are dependent 
on wholesalers coming to them. In a system where the market is geared towards the requirements of 
large producers, it is difficult for such small producers to capture a market share (Meyer, personal 
communication, 1996).  
5.1.2. Kat River 
In the Kat River valley, as part of a black empowerment drive, 14 black farmers were helped to set up 
commercial operations on former state citrus estates. Money was accessed from national sources and 
initial extension support was provided by the para-statal agricultural organization, Ulimicor. The 
demise of this latter body has jeopardized the position of the farmers, who lack the resources and 
machinery to undertake the necessary replanting of trees and transportation of produce. To a 
significant degree the resultant vacuum has been partially addressed by their joining a citrus 
cooperative which, traditionally, had only catered for white farmers (Jonase, personal communication, 
1997). The degree of success which they have achieved suggests that there is scope for black farmers 
to move into commercial agriculture, if it is undertaken on an extensive basis and with adequate 
support services. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that these farmers are operating in one of 
the few irrigated valleys of the Eastern Cape. The aforementioned drought risk and other constraints 
are, however, sobering thoughts. Nonetheless, this example of black and white cooperation is 
inspirational and has the potential to serve as a model for other farmers in other areas.  
5.1.3. Ncera 
The situation in this coastal community with some of the environmentally better conditions for 
farming (annual average rainfall c. 750 mm) is very different from Hertzog and Kat River. Thirty 
aspirant black farmers are anxious to farm more intensively. Their access to small pockets of land 
could certainly make a key contribution to household income and food supply. However, the 
suspension of state ploughing services, low local capacity levels and their inability to secure external 
finance and support have impacted extremely negatively on the local situation (Nel, 1995). The Ncera 
farmers are effectively unable to farm their small plots of land in the absence of external support. In 
many areas of the former Homelands these are key factors making it virtually impossible for emerging 
commercial farmers to operate (Nkosinkulu, personal communication, 1995).  
5.2. Transkei 
5.2.1. Cofimvaba 
In cases where voluntary resettlement by black people within a former Homeland has occurred, the 
picture is a bleak one. In Cofimvaba, a group of approximately 100 households voluntarily settled on a 
defunct state irrigation scheme. Despite having the advantage of prepared fields and access to water, 
there has been no external support or advice. The farmers have undertaken market-gardening, but the 
turnover has been so low that none claim to have earned any money in the 3 years that they have lived 
on the land. Income derived is centrally pooled to cover the costs of inputs and the community ekes 
out an existence in the hope that external support will eventually turn the initiative into a viable project 
(information from 1997 site visit and Gibberd, personal communication, 1997).  
5.3. Border zone 
5.3.1. Gallawater 
This venture clearly demonstrates some of the major difficulties faced by attempts to establish black 
smallholdings in the Eastern Cape. This was a white-owned, irrigated farm of 198 ha producing crops, 
rearing animals and supporting one farmer and his workers. The black community across the border in 
the former Ciskei Homeland decided that possession of this farm would suit their community very 
satisfactorily. They secured a government loan to buy it commercially in 1995 and to settle 105 
families as smallholders. Their basic problem, however, is that they cannot afford to resuscitate the 
irrigation system. They also have no plough or other machinery and have so far (1997) failed to farm 
commercially. Their activity has been restricted to household vegetables and some domestic stock 
grazing. Any available income has gone towards paying off the loan and house construction for the 
settlers.  
5.3.2. Stutterheim 
The Stutterheim Development Foundation is running a pilot project to develop a black commercial 
farming community (Ferreira, personal communication, 1996). Three farmers have been set up on a 
32-ha holding growing onions, spinach and other vegetables. The produce is sold locally and through 
their own stall. They also have two cows and sell milk locally. The Foundation has trained the farmers, 
provided various forms of advice and assisted them with marketing. So far it is not clear how 
successful this enterprise will be. In practice, the farmers have found it difficult to market their 
produce, and lack of electricity has made water pumping for irrigation very difficult. Thus lack of 
resources and financial back-up are curtailing their progress (Nkita, personal communication, 1996).  
5.3.3. Wartburg 
Research undertaken in the Wartburg area in a black community trying to eke out an existence on state 
land revealed a depressing picture. Most people had abandoned farming long ago and now depend 
almost exclusively on state old-age pensions and/or remittances from migrant workers for their 
income. Although land is available, the poor quality of the environment and recurrent drought are 
serious impediments. Where farming is undertaken it tends to be the prerogative of old men, younger 
people seeming to be deterred by the hard work and low returns. Interviews with two of the most 
‘successful' farmers in the area in 1996 revealed a depressing picture (Fetsha, personal 
communication, 1996; Nacau, personal communication, 1996). In 1995 and 1996 there was almost no 
grain production owing to drought. To compound problems, the nominal success of the few farmers 
that there are appears to have provoked resentment in the community and, as a result, crops are stolen 
and fences cut, allowing animals to eat the young crops. In the case of Mr Fetsha (personal 
communication, 1996), stock-theft had dealt him an additional blow. His herd of over 70 cows had 
been reduced to only 20 in the space of 3 years. Such unfortunate practices do not bode well for small-
scale farmers who genuinely wish to farm but have to live under similar conditions. This is a reflection 
of key sociological changes and the unfortunate breakdown of value systems, largely as a result of 
enforced marginalization and discrimination in the past.  
The preceding discussion indicates the considerable obstacles facing black farmers in the Eastern 
Cape. The smallness of holdings, general lack of support and shortage of resources, especially finance, 
are clearly compounded by crime, limited access to markets, low levels of agricultural education and 
inexperience. Even in cases where successful, commercial farming is occurring, as at Hertzog and the 
Kat River, poor market access and the need to improve the farming base are serious impediments. The 
inability of the successful Hertzog cooperative to secure guaranteed market access suggests that in the 
rare cases where small-scale farmers can succeed, the nature of the capitalist-driven market is in itself 
a major obstacle unless the farmers can become associated with an on-going, successful marketing 
system.  
6. Conditions in the former white commercial districts of the 
Eastern Cape 
The history of white, commercial farming has been strikingly different. For generations, state support, 
access to extensive farms, infrastructure and services have ensured a radically different history and 
rural reality today. Such areas are characterized by large, extensive farms which are often several 
hundred ha in extent, have very low population densities and a reasonable degree of agricultural 
productivity. The mainstay of the commercial/white-owned rural area's economy has traditionally 
come from agriculture and forestry. The former has focused almost exclusively on the rearing of 
livestock, with limited cultivation being practised in the better watered and irrigated areas. Years of 
persistent drought, rural depopulation and a decline in the commercial value of animal products (wool 
in particular) have wrought their toll on the area, diminishing agricultural purchasing power, 
employment and the whole base of the region's economy (Nel & Hill, 1997). Even though the land in 
such areas is white owned, the majority of the population (c. 90%) are black and coloured (mixed race) 
farmworkers.  
7. Interviews with white farmers in the Eastern Cape 
The concerns of the large-scale white pastoral farmer in the Eastern Cape are rather different from 
those of his black fellow countryman. They can be summarized as environmental, economic and 
political. The following comments are based upon interviews with white farmers in the drier parts of 
the Eastern Cape where long-term annual average rainfall is less than 400 mm. Here, farm enterprises 
are almost entirely pastoral. Although arable farming is not impossible, due to the variability of 
rainfall it is a hazardous activity, unless water for irrigation can be guaranteed. Interviews were also 
undertaken with agricultural officers, and comments made at a seminar on white farmer attitudes held 
in Rhodes University have also been considered (Roodt, 1996).  
7.1. Environmental factors 
The frequent recurrence of drought has a devastating impact on economic returns, stock numbers and 
employment. Most of South Africa is drought-prone, obliging farmers to develop coping responses to 
deal with the phenomenon (Myburgh, 1994). The time needed for the natural vegetation and pasture to 
recover from drought impacts negatively on these areas (Hayes, personal communication, 1995).  
In these drier areas away from the coast rainfall totals are very variable, both annually and seasonally. 
At Rockhurst, in the Koonap district, the long-term mean is 315 mm. The Koonap Farmers 
Association, in a memorandum complaining of government failure to provide drought relief, produced 
figures for 1983/4 showing that in many areas only 50% of the normal rainfall had been recorded. 
They claimed that in some parts of their area there had been no shower in excess of 10 mm over the 
previous 10 months and that no streamflow had occurred since August 1981 (Koonap Farmers 
Association, 1984).  
The attitude of white farmers to such rainfall variability has varied considerably. There is no doubt that 
in some cases they have continued to carry excess stock in the hope that the drought would go away. 
There are agreed stocking levels for pastoral properties. For example, Vaalkrantz (in the Koonap area, 
see Fig. 1) has an agreed stocking ratio of 1 LSU (livestock unit) to 6 ha. During the 1984 drought this 
was reduced temporarily to 1:10 (Koonap Farmers Association, 1984). It is clear from the Koonap 
Farmers Association papers that there was considerable resistance in some quarters, not only to these 
emergency reductions, but even to the agreed standard stocking levels, which some considered too 
low.  
In contrast, some of the more progressive farmers believe that the agreed general stocking level figures 
are too high. Thus, in August 1996 Vaalkrantz farm was running at 60% of capacity, its owner John 
Berrington believing that in the long run it is much better to have too few animals on a property than 
too many. Understocked pasture regenerates more quickly after a drought. Similarly, the Bloomfield 
family at Rockhurst take the view that one should be ahead of the drought rather than having to 
respond to it. This, they believe, is an economic advantage, since stock reach higher prices when they 
are sold, and it is also environmentally sound as the veldt recovers more quickly when the drought is 
over. Other grazing strategies adopted to cope with rainfall variability and to maintain the veldt 
include having a mixture of grazers (such as sheep) and browsers (such as goats) in the flocks and 
herds, and having a carefully planned, well-distributed water point system with rotational grazing to 
avoid over-use of the range.  
Supplementary enterprises are a hedge against drought and also assist when economic circumstances 
change. Providing suitable soils and water for irrigation are available, a wide range of crops can be 
successfully grown in these drier areas of the Eastern Cape, including chicory, maize, wheat, 
vegetables (including potatoes), citrus and other fruits. Some farmers diversify their livestock by 
ostrich-rearing, which is currently a profitable enterprise, while others rear angora rabbits, poultry and 
other small livestock. Some go in for tourism, which may vary from merely providing farmhouse 
accommodation through to safari packages, as in the case of Shamwari Game Park which lies some 
60 km west of Grahamstown (see Fig. 1). Yet others ensure that some members of the family have 
jobs in town, especially in professional occupations. The diversification enterprises are often in the 
hands of the farmer's wife.  
7.2. Economic factors 
Economically, the white farmers are affected by fluctuating prices almost as much as by the vagaries 
of the rainfall. In the past many have relied upon government drought aid, as shown by the papers of 
the Koonap Farmers Association (1996). However, the more progressive feel that drought aid is not 
advantageous in the long run as it encourages farmers not to undertake necessary changes in farm 
management. In any case, they say, such aid will not be available to them in the new South Africa. 
Sustainable farm planning is an essential prerequisite for success in these dry lands, with a constant 
monitoring of farm costs and income to ensure a proper cash flow. Without such a policy, debt is 
inevitable, burdening many white farmers. Drought relief disbursement by the government to white 
farmers in South Africa in 1992/3 amounted to Rand 844 million (SA Rand 10=approx. UK £1), out of 
total drought disbursements of Rand 1044 million (Singh, 1993). Singh concludes that drought in 
South Africa is a recurrent fact of life but an avoidable disaster. Many of the white farmers of the 
Eastern Cape would agree with this assessment.  
The importance of the stock industry in the study area is self-apparent and one of the unfortunate 
realities is that farmers are being subjected to an escalating incidence of stock theft. In the first half of 
1996 alone, 38 000 head of stock valued at Rand 40 million were stolen from farms in the Eastern 
Cape (radio report by South African Broadcasting Corporation, 3 September 1996). Such action 
seriously impacts on the farming base, and in the most vulnerable areas farmers have often abandoned 
sheep farming in favour of other, less-suitable activities (Hayes, personal communication, 1995).  
7.3. Political factors 
At the forefront of the minds of many white South African farmers is an unease about their future in 
the new South Africa. This lack of security is at present discouraging essential new investment in 
properties in the Eastern Cape. They fear that developments similar to those in Zimbabwe will occur 
as the government tries to provide more land for black farmers, and that expropriation of their lands 
may be one option. They point out that moves against them will not only harm the South African 
economy as a whole, but will also adversely affect the black African rural worker and exacerbate the 
drift to the towns (Singh, 1993). White farmers in the Eastern Cape have no objection to coexisting 
with black farmers providing that there is a level playing field (Roodt, 1996). They have grave 
reservations about some of the black farming schemes that have been suggested and are strongly 
against the development of cooperative farming, which they see as a recipe for disaster, pointing to its 
failure in many other parts of the continent (Roodt, 1996). They also see no future for successful 
smallholdings for black farmers in the Eastern Cape away from the wetter areas of good soil with 
adequate irrigation water enabling intensive cultivation to take place. In areas with less than 400 mm 
average annual rainfall, with poorer soils and without irrigation, a holding of at least 1300 ha is 
required to support a family with a good standard of living. Such large pastoral holdings allow for the 
adjustment of enterprises and grazing systems according to how and where the rain falls and 
encourage sensible destocking at the onset of drought. White farmers concede that black farmers might 
be prepared to accept lower living standards, but fear that small properties would lead to a repetition of 
the overstocking and land degradation that occurred in the former Homelands.  
Regarding land availability for black farmers, they point out that large areas outside their holdings are 
simply unused in black areas and suggest these areas should first be rehabilitated for agricultural use 
before expropriating lands from white farmers. Many white farmers also question the notion that there 
are many black farmers who wish to take on the responsibility, or have the desire and education to 
become pastoral farmers. Their fears for the future are also enhanced by the increasing lack of civil 
security and losses of stock through theft.  
Escalating violence, particularly against white farmers, has wreaked a heavy toll on the economy and 
psychology of the area. In the latter part of 1997, a murder of at least one farmer a week had become 
common in South Africa. There is a clear criminal motivation behind the action, which has provoked 
anger from the organized farming community over the state's inability to deal with the problem. Calls 
to take the law into their own hands and exact revenge have become commonplace (Weekend Post, 15 
November 1997; South African Broadcasting Corporation, 5 December 1997). In a recent, well-
publicized murder, a farmer's wife was executed in front of her four young children who were told by 
the murderers to “take a good look—this is how white farmers will be treated in future” (Weekend 
Post, 15 November 1997). Such events have an extremely negative impact on farming conditions and 
future potential.  
In the light of the constraints that farming is experiencing in the predominantly white farming districts, 
caution needs to be exercised in the planning and goal-setting of any resettlement/land transfer 
programme, to ensure that what is proposed is environmentally and commercially viable.  
7.4. Discussion 
In short, the white farmers' view is that many would welcome the emergence of a successful black 
pastoral farming community and there is clearly potential for this. In this dry zone there are many 
marginal farmers who would be prepared to sell to black farmers or the state. Many have good 
relations with their black neighbours but suffer from stock theft. So far, little progress has been made 
on this (Hayes, personal communication, 1995). The white farmers' fear is that unless the plans are 
very carefully organized and properly financed, they could lead to an environmentally disastrous 
situation in these dry pastoral lands. They point out that many of the successful white farmers have 
had generations of experience of coping with drought, changing economic circumstances and changing 
government policies. They question how many suitable black farmers there really are who want to 
become commercial ranchers and point to the not very encouraging results that are beginning to 
emerge from Botswana's programme of encouraging indigenous-run ranches. They do not believe that 
merely taking land from them, by whatever means, would solve any problems or create a viable black 
farmer class.  
8. The potential for resettlement in the Eastern Cape 
If rural development for black farmers is to be undertaken it will have to be broad based and multi-
faceted in approach. Seeking ways in which to provide adequate access to land for black farmers who 
wish to farm commercially will clearly need to go hand in hand with state support and financial 
assistance. The moral justification for such action cannot be disputed. Practical constraints could, 
however, seriously impinge on such action. In addition to issues such as a shortage of funds and 
trained personnel, questions can be raised over the economic and environmental viability of resettling 
what might be large numbers of black farmers in areas which, to date, have only been used for 
extensive farming. The prevailing low rainfall and poor soil quality oblige a reliance on extensive 
stock-farming in vast areas, with areas of less than 1000 ha often not being regarded as an economic 
unit (Wilmot, personal communication, 1998). Stocking ratios of 1 LSU per 3.5–6 ha are common in 
drier areas, which is indicative of the fact that extensive farming might be regarded as inevitable. 
Many of the stock farms in the districts surrounding the Homelands are significantly in excess of 
1000 ha which, though catering for the radically different lifestyle of white farmers, still suggests that 
extensive farms are required to generate an adequate livelihood. Despite the fact that more intensive 
dryland farming could be an alternative, to date there does not appear to be evidence of successful 
small-scale farming in such areas.  
The exceptions to this principle are the better watered coastal areas, or the limited number of irrigated 
farms, where farming on 1–2 ha is viable, as the Hertzog case study suggests. Over and above moral 
and political imperatives, the legitimate demands of black farmers and the lifestyle of white farmers, 
there are far broader economic and demographic realities and trends. One of the most logical target 
areas for resettlement, which is currently under discussion by the Department of Land Affairs, is the 
area lying between the two former Homelands and fringing their northern borders (see Fig. 1) 
(Gibberd, personal communication, 1997). This area has significant environmental variations within it, 
ranging from the coastal plain to the arid interior. The broad demographic and economic potential of 
this zone for the purpose of black resettlement is examined next.  
8.1. Rural population in the Border Zone 
The major population groupings in the area consist of a small group (5–10% varying according to sub-
district) of white farmers and their families who own most of the land in the area and a significantly 
larger group of black and coloured (mixed-race) farm workers and rural dwellers who live on the 
farms or in the small rural centres. Table 1 details the rural population figures. The three age classes 
broadly indicate the pre-reproductive and not yet economically active group, the potentially 
economically active and reproductive group, and the group traditionally viewed as economically 
inactive and dependent. The first key feature is the high dependency ratio, reflected primarily in the 
youthful nature of the population. Second is the gender imbalance within the economically active 
category, reflecting a shortage of local employment opportunities and the resultant male migration in 
search of work in distant urban areas. Third, after an initial slow population increase of 7% in 
10 years, there has been a dramatic decline since 1980. This reflects economic recession and drought 
in the rural areas which has resulted in retrenchments in the agricultural sector and a movement to 
urban areas. In summary, between 1970 and 1991 the overall rural population density declined from 
6.5 to 4.9 persons per km2.  
 
Table 1. Rural population in the Border Zone 
 
 
8.2. Rural employment in the Border Zone 
Table 2 reveals that farming is the major source of rural employment. There has been a dramatic 
decline in both agricultural and total employment. The figures reflect the contraction in the farming 
economy and the massive outmigration in recent years. Although unemployment numbers may have 
fallen, nearly 70% of the population are still economically inactive.  
Table 2. Rural employment in the Border Zone 
 
 
8.3. Agricultural production and sales in the Border Zone 
Gross marketed agricultural products of the region by value are dominated by livestock sales (c. 94% 
over a 10-year average) (Republic of South Africa, 1992a). Summer cereals, winter cereals and 
vegetables constitute the balance of production (6%), with production fluctuating markedly, as a result 
of rainfall variations, from 7500 to 20 000 t for all crops in the entire area in the 1980s (Republic of 
South Africa, 1987 and Republic of South Africa, 1988). Attention of necessity must be accorded to 
livestock farming. The figures in Table 3 are indicative of the changes that have occurred in this sector 
as a result of factors as diverse as drought, stock theft and declining wool prices (for merino sheep and 
angora goats). Cattle numbers have remained relatively constant during the period, being more 
dependent on local demands for dairy and meat products. The low 1988 figures reflect drought 
conditions, which are borne out by the changes in the livestock stocking rates. 
 
Table 3. Changes in stock numbers in the Border Zone: 1975–94 
 
 
8.4. Implications for the Border Zone 
The general decline in the number of animals kept by farmers and the loss of nearly half the 
agricultural employment opportunities have had serious repercussions for the rural population and the 
small urban centres that serve these areas. Under the current ownership and management system there 
are clearly no realistic opportunities for the residents of neighbouring Homeland areas. Although the 
demographic trends contrast with the high population numbers in the Homelands, the constraints that 
are clearly being experienced by commercial farming suggest that the notion of establishing and 
resettling black farmers might not deliver the intended results. Although the process of land 
resettlement could be embarked upon, as the experience of Stutterheim and Gallawater detailed above 
suggests, extensive financial support and advice will required. Even if farming can be established, the 
broad trends in the agricultural economy and the constraints experienced in the former white 
commercial areas do not give grounds for optimism for the long-term viability of small-scale farming. 
If resettlement policies are to be pursued, caution and sober judgement about what they can 
realistically achieve needs to filter into the planning process.  
9. Assessment and conclusion 
The establishment of a flourishing new breed of black South African smallholder farmers operating in 
the commercial sector is an exciting prospect with a clear basis in social justice, especially in view of 
the treatment received by black rural dwellers in past decades. The history of a reasonably sound 
agriculture reported from the Ciskei towards the end of the 19th century is encouraging. On the other 
hand, the world has changed, and commercial agriculture with it. Many of the able-bodied and more 
enterprising have already left rural areas in search of a ‘better life' in the towns. Rural life in the 
former Homelands has become a degraded mode of existence associated with high dependency on 
government handouts and remittances from those working away from home. Any journey through 
these areas today illustrates their run-down nature and the malaise in many rural settlements. At 
present, rural areas are not particularly attractive places, as the figures given in the preceding section 
reflect. The question arises as to how many urban dwellers with sound farming experience exist, and 
how many of these would really want to return to the countryside.  
Even among the present black rural population it not clear how many want the responsibility and 
uncertainty of running a commercial farm or have sufficient agricultural education to do so? 
Entrenched rural poverty and marginalization appear to be the causes of the destructive practice of 
stock theft which has restricted farming potential. Other hindering factors include drought, problems 
of access to land, shortages of funds, limited access to external markets and failure to penetrate 
established markets. These are indeed daunting challenges which will need to be addressed before the 
success of a new, emerging class of black farmers can be assured.  
On the positive side, the population reduction reported from the Border area suggests that it might be 
easier to redistribute land to smallholders than if the population were still rising. Environmentally, too, 
the more coastal areas and river valleys are conducive to smallholder commercial agriculture; 
experience at Hertzog and Kat River seems to support this conclusion. In the drier areas, where 
livestock farming is the norm, the situation may be different. Here, there are inherent advantages in 
larger-scale enterprises, as the experience of the white ranchers would suggest, which would restrict, 
though not necessarily exclude, options for large-scale resettlement to smallholdings. In areas such as 
these, as well as in the region as a whole, other options in terms of rural non-farm employment also 
need to be explored and encouraged.  
The evidence from the Eastern Cape suggests that it is quite possible for a new breed of commercial 
black smallholder farmers to develop, but that they will require considerable back-up in terms of 
finance and technical know-how. Experience from other parts of Africa demonstrates that, important 
as they may be, these will not ensure success. A whole programme of rural development will be 
required, involving marketing systems, road networks and soil and water conservation (Seavoy, 1989; 
Marshall, 1994). Marketing is clearly a key challenge; in earlier decades, white farmers depended on 
state support and guaranteed access to markets. Emerging black farmers have access to neither and 
clearly defined national policy will be required to ensure them an adequate market share and 
meaningful support.  
As the experience of Hertzog reveals, there also appears to be a role for cooperative enterprises among 
the farmers themselves, pooling their resources to obtain better prices for their products and lower 
costs for their inputs. Another possibility is to entice successful private entrepreneurs from the city to 
invest in the countryside. However, again evidence from other parts of Africa points to the potential 
problem of the wrong kind of entrepreneur interested merely in a quick profit at the expense of the 
land, rather than in its proper nurturing (Marshall, 1994).  
In short, possibilities for resettlement in the Border area do exist: there are white farmers who would 
be prepared to sell their land; the environment can be managed and a network of rural centres already 
exists. The key problem is a managerial one. A piecemeal approach cannot suffice; concerted and 
coordinated action in the broad area of rural development will be required in order to ensure success.  
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